Hannah Davis, University of California, San Diego
From 12:30 until 13:30
At Zoom: https://ethz.zoom.us/j/62282337238
https://ethz.zoom.us/j/62282337238
Abstract:
Widely used cryptographic protocols like TLS 1.3 (Transport Layer Security) have seen increased adoption recently on the basis of their claims of provable security. These claims refer to the results of rigorous academic proofs in a formal key-exchange model; however, the actual claims and guarantees rarely reach developers or implementors of TLS, let alone the end user. Thanks to this distance, prior proofs of security for TLS 1.3 used certain assumptions and techniques that entirely void their guarantees for TLS 1.3.
In this talk, I'll discuss two of my recent results correcting these assumptions and proving security for TLS 1.3 on a global scale. Then I'll talk about ways to close the gap between the specifications of cryptography like TLS 1.3 and formal models of the same in the design stage, to avoid this type of error for future cryptography.
Join the Zoom meeting at 12:30 on Thursday, October 7th: https://ethz.zoom.us/j/62282337238