Abstract: Quantum computers are expected to provide efficient solutions to problems that are conjectured to be intractable for classical computers (such as the simulation of quantum physical system). This raises the following question: can a classical computer efficiently verify the results of a quantum computation? In 2018, Urmila Mahadev answered this question in the affirmative
Abstract: In this talk, I will first introduce the Cyber-Defence Campus, including its main topics of interest and activities. I will then show with two application examples how machine learning can enable us to analyze and anticipate cybersecurity risks at scale. First, we will see how supervised and unsupervised learning algorithms can help detect intrusions
Abstract: A multitude of wireless technologies are used by an aircraft during flight. From a conceptual perspective, all of them are insecure as security was never part of their design and the evolution of legacy systems in aviation did not keep up with the state of the art. Recent contributions from academic and hacking communities
Abstract: This talk reports on the latest computational records in integer factoring and finite field discrete logarithms. These hard computational problems underpin the security of the public-key cryptographic primitives known as RSA and finite field Diffie-Hellman, which are still the most used public-key cryptographic primitives in many contexts. This work required a quite formidable amount of computing power, from various
Abstract: Probabilistic data structures use space-efficient representations of data in order to (approximately) respond to queries about the data. Traditionally, these structures are accompanied by probabilistic bounds on query-response errors. These bounds implicitly assume benign attack models, in which the data and the queries are chosen non-adaptively, and independent of the randomness used to construct
Abstract: A central element of designing IT security infrastructures is the logical segmentation of information assets into network zones sharing the same security requirements and policies. As more business ecosystems are migrated to the cloud, additional demands for cybersecurity emerge and make the network-zone operation and management for large corporate networks challenging. In this talk,
Abstract: For many cryptographic proofs and arguments, the burden of proof is on the prover. Computing proofs for large statements is a bottleneck, despite the fact that we know how to produce amazingly succinct proofs with incredibly fast verification times. Very few works can claim prover algorithms which are truly asymptotically optimal, so that the
Abstract: This talk presents our research into the security of programmable smartcards, which are widely used devices that implement a wide range of cryptosystems, yet are mostly black-box with hardly any public information about their workings. By the end of the talk, you will learn – How we find vulnerabilities in smartcards using our open-source tools, even though
Abstract: After a plethora of high-profile Rowhammer attacks, CPU and DRAM vendors scrambled to deliver what was meant to be the definitive hardware solution against the Rowhammer problem: Target Row Refresh (TRR). A common belief among practitioners is that, for the latest generation of DDR4 systems that are protected by TRR, Rowhammer is no longer an issue in practice. During
Abstract: The security and architecture communities will remember 2018 as the year of side channels. Starting from Spectre and Meltdown, time and again we have seen how basic performance-improving features can be exploited to violate fundamental hardware security guarantees. In this talk, I will survey a line of work on speculative execution attacks, showing how