#### **ETH** zürich




# **Zurich Information Security and Privacy Center (ZISC)**

**Srdjan Čapkun** ZISC Director

#### **ZISC** is a Security and Privacy Research Center of ETH Zurich

- Enables collaborations between ETH, industry and public institutions
- Open Lab: a collaborative space for **ETH-industry collaboration**
- 60 researchers
  - From cryptography to wireless security
  - Blockchains, E-voting, Secure Internet, Secure Positioning **Formal Verification, Policy Monitoring**

















# Security Startups (recently) Created by ZISC Students/Faculty







Secure Ranging Technology (IoT)

Secure Networking Solutions

Security intelligence Network Analytics



**Usable Authentication Solutions** 

Other Security-Related Startups in Computer Science @ ETHZ




**Malware Detection** 



Code Generation / ML

# **ZISC** @ ETH Zurich

https://www.zisc.ethz.ch





#### ETH zürich




On the (In)security of our Cyber-Physical World

Srdjan Capkun (Srđan Čapkun) ETH Zürich


#### **ETH** zürich

#### **Security and Privacy: Data Confidentiality**



#### **EIH** zürich

#### **Security and Privacy: Data Confidentiality**



# Security and Privacy: Everything is Being Hacked





#### **Security and Privacy: We Are Backing Off**





# Cyber-Physical Systems - What Are We Afraid Of?

Srdjan Čapkun | June 26, 2017 | 10

# Cyber-Physical Systems - What Are We Afraid Of?

Copyright ETH Zurich



#### Afraid of Attacks that can do Physical Harm

- Cyber-Physical Systems have real physical impact on our environment
- Sense the environment [spoofed?]
- **Controlled by computers [hacked?]**
- Act on the environment [ouch?]

#### Afraid of Attacks that can do Physical Harm

HACKERS FOOL TESLA S'S AUTOPILOT TO HIDE AND SPOOF OBSTACLES



#### Security



#### Move over, Stuxnet: Industroyer malware linked to Kiev blackouts

Modular nasty can seize direct control of substation switches and circuit breakers

By John Leyden 12 Jun 2017 at 15:36

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# Spoofing of Radar, Ultrasonic Sensors, and Cameras (Tesla)



#### **ETH** zürich


#### **Spoofing Position: GPS Spoofing Attacks and Defenses**

- ZISC researchers demonstrated GPS spoofing attacks
- https://securepositioning.com
- https://zisc.ethz.ch

'We hacked U.S. drone': Iran claims it electronically hijacked spy aircraft's GPS and tricked aircraft into landing on its soil

- RQ-170 Sentinel drone has been seen on display by Iran's gloating military . Engineer claims Iran downed drone by using fake signals to confuse it
- . Claimed GPS signals are easy to hack without cracking U.S. control codes Alleges aircraft's GPS weakness was long known to U.S. military officials






#### **Spoofing Distances: Relay Attacks on Cars**

- In 2011 We Published First Attack Against **PKES Systems**
- Attack Allows to Open and Start All **Modern Cars**






Cost went down from 1000\$ (2011) to 22\$ (2017)

#### **Hack into Cars & Protect Cars**



#### **SW/HW hacking of Legacy and Embedded Systems**

Fridges, lightbulbs, insulin pumps, energy substations, PLCs,









tech









FDA confirms that St. Jude's cardiac devices can be hacked

by Selena Larson @selenalarson

(L) January 9, 2017; 3:53 PM ET





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




# Dedicated Programmers, Control Interfaces of Robots, Machinery



Recent ZISC research: compromise input so that the operator doesn't notice before physical damage



#### **Privacy**



#### Killing car privacy by federal mandate

JUNE 21, 2017 BY LEONID REYZIN 3 COMMENTS

The US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) is **proposing** a requirement that every car should broadcast a cleartext message specifying its exact position, speed, and heading ten times per second. In **comments filed** 

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## Why is This Happening

- Why is this happening?
  - High Complexity and Interconnectivity of Systems
  - Wide-Spread Knowledge and Available Tools
  - Traditional Industries Still Playing Catch-Up
  - Underestimation of cost / attacker's knowledge
  - 'Post-Snowden' World
- Unless not addressed
  - Will Prevent the Deployment of Many Technologies / Stall Progress
  - Will Negatively Impact the Development of our Societies

#### **TH** zürich

#### No 'Silver Bullet'



#### **TIH** zürich

#### No 'Silver Bullet': We Just Need to Solve Many Challenges

- Software/Hardware Attestation
- Spoofing Detection Techniques
- Robust ML/AI
- Formal Protocol and Software Verification

- Better Practices and Awareness (Education)
- Not equate Compliance with Security
- & we need new enabling technologies!




#### **Example: Preventing Distance Spoofing**

- Developed new Secure Distance Measurement **Techniques**
- >200m range, 15cm LoS precision



(3DB Access)






# **Example: Detecting GPS Spoofing**

- Built First Open Source Spoofing-Resistant **GPS** Receiver
- https://www.spree-gnss.ch/








#### **Example: Remote (Software) Attestation**

Remotely Attest the state (i.e., code) of a device



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#### Physical World Provides Opportunities: Secure Distance Meas.

- If key fob close (1m) to the car/door => unlock the car/door
- If laptop close (1m) to the access point => allow network access
- If phone in the building/room => allow access to data
- if phone/card close (20cm) to the terminal => execute payment
- If bracelet close (10cm) to the gun => allow the gun to be fired
- If two devices close (10cm) => establish keys
- **Secure Distance Measurement => Usable Security (in these contexts).**

# **Physical World Provides Opportunities: Online Authentication**

username srdjan@ethz.ch

password

password1234

Users use easy passwords and reuse the same passwords for various applications

3 billion passwords have been stolen in the last 9 years

code

926 358








That's why companies use **strong authentication**.


#### Physical World Provides Opportunities: Online Authentication

Soundproof: Usable, Continuous Authentication by Ambient Sound





# Physical World Provides Opportunities: Wireless Channel



- In a complex, multipath-rich environment, channels exhibit time-varying, stochastic and reciprocal fading.
- For receivers that are  $> \lambda/2$  away, channels are not correlated.

#### Conclusion

- Cyber Physical Systems present both Challenges and Opportunities
- They act on our environment and thus present danger.
- They exist in our environment and can therefore help us build more usable and secure systems.